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f o r e w o r d
A recurring theme in recent Wincott Lectures has been the 
need to defend the virtues of economic liberalism against interest 
groups which, whether out of ill will or ignorance, seek to restrict 
the functioning of markets. In his 2000 lecture, for example, 
Professor David Henderson warned against the threat posed by 
what he called ‘new millennium collectivism’, a view of the world 
in which global capitalism is portrayed as sweeping peoples and 
governments before it, exploiting workers and driving down 
en vironmental standards. These attitudes are by no means 
conﬁ ned to a lunatic fringe, and they have to be rebutted vigor-
ously by those who believe in the market economy. 
Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, in his 2001 lecture, drew on 
Polish experience to explain why some ex-communist countries 
in eastern and central Europe had handled the transition to the 
market more successfully than others. A crucial ingredient, he 
pointed out, was the presence in government of competent and 
determined reformers, who were able to explain and win support 
for the changes that were needed. Without such leadership, 
there was a danger that the anti-reformist camp, nostalgic for the 
supposed stability of the communist era, would gain ground. 
This need for persuasive reformers is particularly acute at the 
present time in the European Union. Although the Union, in its 
original ‘Common Market’ form, was built on free trade, enthu-
FOREWORD 
siasm for liberalisation appears to be waning. One indication has 
been the extreme difﬁ culty that the European Commission has 
faced in attempting to open up trade in services. Another is the 
ﬁ erce resistance, especially in Germany, to the proposed takeover 
directive, which would have facilitated cross-border acquisitions 
and increased competition in European industry. This lack of 
progress on market-opening measures reﬂ ects in part a widespread 
unease about the impact of competition – and about ‘globalisa-
tion’ – which political leaders have done too little to dispel. 
To make matters worse, there is a lack of trust in European 
institutions which was manifested most dramatically in the rejec-
tion by voters in France and the Netherlands of the proposed 
European constitution. Yet, as Professor Patrick Messerlin shows 
in this IEA Occasional Paper – containing the text of his 2005 
Wincott Lecture, together with three commentaries – these votes 
can be seen, not as a disaster for Europe, but as an opportunity to 
rethink the purpose of the Union. 
Professor Messerlin argues persuasively that the Union has been 
trying to do too much, especially in pushing for a Europe-wide social 
agenda, covering matters that should largely be left to national 
governments. Instead of promoting the idea of the European Union 
as some kind of super-state, political leaders should refocus their 
efforts on measures that can genuinely improve the well-being of 
their citizens – and contribute to a better world.
The lecture identiﬁ es the potential gains for Europe from 
further economic liberalisation, particularly in agriculture and 
services. On the former, Professor Messerlin shows that the 
European Union would be the big winner from reform – it would 
obtain around half of all global gains from full liberalisation by 
the developed countries alone, and roughly one third of the gains 
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from worldwide liberalisation. On services, he points out that the 
level of protection is much higher than in goods; an opening up 
of the market would have the same dynamic effect in services as it 
already has had in goods. It would have the additional advantage 
of bringing the single market within the reach of the small and 
medium-sized service providers that have been largely excluded 
from it to date. 
If the gains from reform are so large, why is there no popular 
consensus behind it? Part of the answer lies in the timidity of polit-
ical leaders, and this has contributed to ignorance and misunder-
standing among the public at large. One of Professor Messerlin’s 
central themes is the urgent need to develop in Europe a stronger 
‘culture of evaluation’ – a continuing ﬂ ow of well-researched assess-
ments, produced by independent think tanks and other institu-
tions, of the costs and beneﬁ ts of speciﬁ c economic reforms. As he 
puts it, ‘By showing that any liberalisation brings global gains but 
leaves some net losers, a culture of evaluation shifts the spotlight 
to two key questions: is there a need for an adjustment policy, and, 
if yes, what would be the best compensation instrument to use?’
This lecture, by setting out some of the key issues that should 
be on Europe’s economic agenda, provides an admirable starting 
point for this evaluation process. The trustees of the Wincott 
Foundation are grateful to Professor Messerlin for accepting 
our invitation to deliver the 2005 Wincott Lecture, and to Lord 
Brittan, Pedro Schwartz and John Gillingham for their thoughtful 
and constructive comments.
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s u m m a r y
• The ‘No’ votes in the French and Dutch referenda on the 
proposed EU constitution highlight the need to design 
an economic agenda for the EU that ﬁ ts soundly with the 
fundamental nature and purpose of the EU.
• The ‘No’ votes mark the end of the idea that the EU can be 
a European ‘super-state’ providing a wide range of social 
policies and instead can lead to the return of the EU to its 
origins set out in the slim Treaty of Rome.
• The ﬁ rst part of an economic agenda for the future of the EU 
is to establish a genuine single market that is truly integrated 
and open and not subject to restrictive regulation. This will 
involve challenging European protectionism and fears about 
globalisation.
• Liberalisation of agricultural policy is an important 
component of a genuine European single market. Domestic 
support to agriculture should be removed and subsidies 
signiﬁ cantly reduced with a view to their complete 
elimination.
• While the single market in manufacturing is relatively 
advanced compared with agriculture, there is still a lot to do 
to eliminate the trade barriers between the EU and the rest of 
the world and facilitate greater inter-EU trade. 
SUMMARY
• The ‘strategic casino-and-yogurt policy’ of prohibiting 
takeovers of domestic ﬁ rms deemed essential to national 
economies (nowadays dubbed ‘economic nationalism’) must 
be opposed if a genuine single market is to develop.
• The prospect of a single market in services has generated 
even more and deeper fears than the single market in 
goods. Harmonisation and mutual recognition have proved 
ineffective means of liberalising services. Allowing the largest 
possible freedom to invest in other member states’ services 
markets offers a more fruitful way forward.
• The EU’s trade policy is effectively its foreign policy. Trade 
agreements with Turkey and other non-EU countries may 
be used to secure the traditional foreign policy goals of 
maintaining good international relations and promoting 
democratic governance.
• Successful reform will require a ‘culture of evaluation’ within 
Europe in which independent think tanks and research 
institutes inform public debate about the costs and beneﬁ ts of 
different EU policies and proposed reforms. 
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Introduction
The ‘No’ majorities in the French and Dutch referenda on the 
proposed European constitution were so large, and the two 
countries so different, that they have created a sense of crisis or 
resignation across much of Europe. Both reactions are, however, 
unjustiﬁ ed. On the contrary, these votes should be seen as 
bringing with them a sense of clariﬁ cation that the EU has been 
so sorely lacking over the last two decades. In short, they highlight 
the need to design an economic agenda that ﬁ ts soundly both with 
the EU’s real purpose and with its fundamental nature.
Properly understanding the ‘No’ votes requires us to take a 
broad approach. First, far from being an accident or a surprise, 
the French ‘Non’ was in fact quite predictable. French people with 
a positive opinion of EU membership have been a minority (48 
per cent) since 1998, while those with a positive opinion of the 
beneﬁ ts of the EU have been an even smaller minority (45 per 
cent) since 1993.1 Both ﬁ gures provide quite accurate forecasts of 
the ‘Yes’ vote (44 per cent), and one can only be ﬂ abbergasted by 
the gamble taken by the French government when it asked for a 
1 These ﬁ gures are simple averages of the Eurobarometer Standard poll results 
published every spring. That the annual results have a very small standard devi-
ation (2.5) over the period underlines the persistence of French opinion.
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referendum. Second, the same source shows that German public 
opinion is similar to French as regards EU membership, but signif-
icantly more negative (much closer to British public opinion) on 
the beneﬁ ts of the EU. Had a referendum taken place in Germany, 
a ‘Nein’ certainly could not have been ruled out.
In this context, what the French ‘Non’ really does is lift a 
weighty burden from the EU’s shoulders, namely the desire that 
it should be some kind of ‘super-state’. In particular, the French 
referendum makes it clear that the hodgepodge of issues referred 
to during the campaign as the ‘social model’ (labour market 
regulations, income distribution, etc.) should remain matters of 
strictly national competence. Although French voters as a whole 
apparently have very little idea as to what their future ‘social 
model’ should actually look like, their votes mean that they are 
not ready to accept a Europe-wide social agenda. This is in direct 
opposition to what their political masters have pushed for since 
tabling the notion of a Social Charter. In sum, the French ‘Non’ 
marks the comeback of the slim Treaty of Rome as against its 
somewhat more obese successors of the last decade or so.
Another hallmark of the French campaign was the unholy 
alliance of, on the one hand, vocal NGOs profoundly opposed 
to markets per se and, on the other, a myriad of much more 
discrete lobbies primarily concerned with hanging on to the rents 
they derive from regulated markets. This situation has led some 
observers to express doubts about the viability of a European 
economic agenda for the coming years.
I will argue that, on the contrary, the agenda is surprisingly 
vast. First, nobody during the two campaigns argued against the 
single market in goods. Indeed, the French referendum may even 
have moved things forward in relation to one sacred cow (no pun 
intended), namely agriculture. Beyond the pathetic rearguard 
actions of the French government at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), there are clear signs 
that a wide array of French farmers are desperately looking for a 
way out – meaning a serious reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy and an opening of European farm markets. Second, only 
one – arguably crucial – aspect of the single market in services hit 
a raw nerve: the principle of the country of origin included in the 
initial proposal for a Services Directive and the regime of regu-
latory competition that it establishes amongst member states. 
This still leaves a lot to be done with respect to the other, appar-
ently uncontested, aspects of the single market in services, and it 
suggests key actions for successfully addressing the unavoidable 
issue of regulatory competition in a pro-growth strategy. Third, 
the foreign dimension of the European agenda – most notably the 
EU’s relations with Turkey – has reached a point where it requires 
a drastic reformulation that market-based initiatives could help to 
design.
The single market in goods: unfi nished business
European politicians tend to talk about the single market as if 
it really existed. Europeans themselves are not so convinced, 
and they are right. There is still a lot to do, even in goods. If the 
single market were truly deeply integrated and open, it would 
exhibit two features: regulations in all the member states would 
be roughly equally pro-competitive (reﬂ ecting intra-EU openness) 
and they would tend to be less restrictive than those of the other 
OECD countries (mirroring extra-EU openness). The available 
evidence does not support either test. As Table 1 shows, some 
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member states were among the most regulated OECD countries in 
1998 and 2003, while others were among the least regulated ones 
for both years.2 In sum, member states follow the general trend 
of regulatory reforms in OECD countries, not a speciﬁ c European 
pattern. 
The EU’s half-century-long history shows that progress 
towards a single market very much depends on having an open 
trade policy. There are two reasons for this. World competition 
tends to be a more powerful force than intra-European competi-
tion (Jacquemin and Sapir, 1991). And multilateral market opening 
has offered EU member states new trade-offs, in addition to those 
available within Europe, thereby making intra-EU deals easier to 
swallow. Examples abound. The Kennedy Round was essential to 
resolving conﬂ icts over the level of the common external tariff; the 
Uruguay Round was instrumental in bringing about more integ-
rated European markets in cars, chemicals, etc.
The current lack of progress in the Doha Round is thus not 
only a danger for the world economy, but also a serious threat to 
European integration. But is any progress possible when France 
and a few other member states remain so stubbornly  protectionist-
 minded? Posing the question in this way demonstrates the need 
to move beyond the traditional clichés. Opinion surveys have 
repeatedly shown that a large majority (65 per cent) of the French 
population have a ‘very or somewhat favourable opinion’ of freer 
trade, only marginally less than is the case among the British (72 
per cent), the Germans (70 per cent) and the Americans (66 per 
2 Table 1 is based on ‘product market regulation’ indicators from an international 
database on the regulations imposed on products and services in OECD coun-
tries (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005). They vary from least (0) to most (6) 
restrictive regulation in thirty OECD countries in 1998 and 2003 (they do not 
cover all the new EU member states).
Table 1 Product-market regulation (PMR) indicators
Rank EC15/25 OECD PMR PMR Change
 member members* 1998 2003 (%)
 1 EC15 Britain 1.1 0.9 −18.2
 2  Australia 1.3 0.9  −30.8
 3  USA 1.3 1.0 −23.1
 4  Iceland 1.6 1.0 −37.5
 5  New Zealand 1.4 1.1 −21.4
 6 EC15 Denmark 1.5 1.1 −26.7
 7 EC15 Ireland 1.5 1.1 −26.7
 8  Canada 1.4 1.2 −14.3
 9 EC15 Sweden 1.8 1.2 −33.3
10  Japan 1.9 1.3 −31.6
11 EC15 Finland 2.1 1.3 −38.1
12 EC15 Netherlands 1.8 1.4 −22.2
13 EC15 Austria 1.8 1.4 −22.2
14 EC15 Germany 1.9 1.4 −26.3
15 EC15 Belgium 2.1 1.4 −33.3
16 EC25 Slovakia 3.0 1.4 −53.3
17  Norway 1.8 1.5 −16.7
18  Korea 2.5 1.5 −40.0
19 EC15 Portugal 2.1 1.6 −23.8
20 EC15 Spain 2.3 1.6 −30.4
21  Switzerland 2.2 1.7 −22.7
22 EC15 France 2.5 1.7 −32.0
23 EC25 Czech Rep. 3.0 1.7 −43.3
24 EC15 Greece 2.8 1.8 −35.7
25 EC15 Italy 2.8 1.9 −32.1
26 EC25 Hungary 2.5 2.0 −20.0
27  Mexico 2.4 2.2 −8.3
28  Turkey 3.1 2.3 −25.8
29 EC25 Poland 3.9 2.8 −28.2
 EC15 All member states 2.0 1.4 −28.7
Source: Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005
*Not all the EU member states are OECD members
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cent) (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2005). These 
ﬁ gures do not capture French fears about globalisation; neither do 
they capture German, British or American ones. But these fears 
are much more closely related to what happens in services, and so 
are discussed in more detail in the services section, below.
Agriculture
If there is one goods sector in which the single market’s progress 
depends heavily on multilateral trade opening, it is agriculture. 
Modelling the gains from farm liberalisation suggests that the 
EU is a key winner: the EU alone would obtain around half of all 
global gains from full liberalisation by the developed countries 
alone, and roughly one third of the gains from worldwide liber-
alisation (Anderson et al., 2001). But on the other hand, liber-
alisation by the EU is also a key condition for net gains by other 
countries, in particular a large number of developing countries 
(Diao et al., 2003).
The CAP: implacable foe of the single market in agriculture
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has systematically 
prevented the emergence of pan-European farm markets because 
its subsidies and price supports protect each member state’s inef-
ﬁ cient farmers from more efﬁ cient ones, be they from foreign 
countries or from other member states. The 2003 CAP reform is 
a shining example of this. As it maintained support prices and the 
level of domestic subsidies (FAPRI, 2003; OECD, 2004), it did not 
open EU farm markets to world competition. This is best captured 
by the fact that the reform has reduced the EU’s average tariff-like 
protection level by a miserable two points, from 57 to 55 per cent 
(OECD, 2004).3
As a result, the 2003 reform was nothing more than a ‘box 
game’ – i.e. the EU just used sleight of hand to shift its subsidies 
from the WTO’s Blue Box to the Green Box by ‘decoupling’ them 
(deﬁ ning them independently from the current level of produc-
tion). But decoupling has fuelled fears of a mass movement of 
large farmers towards new crops, all the more so because the 
2003 reform has done nothing whatsoever to eliminate, or even 
weaken, the CAP’s strong bias in favour of large farms – the 
largest 20 per cent of European farms get more than 70 per cent 
of all European farm subsidies. As a result, some member states 
have begun to protect the relatively less subsidised crops (such as 
fruits and vegetables) against investments funded by decoupled 
subsidies – one more step in fragmenting EU farm markets. The 
2003 decoupling policy has an additional major shortfall. As no 
deadline was imposed on the decoupled payments (leaving the 
impression that such payments were there for ever) the 2003 
reform tried to justify subsidy decoupling by a renewed insistence 
on a wide range of ‘cross-compliance’ criteria based on statutory 
environmental, food safety, animal welfare and animal and plant 
health standards. A non-exhaustive ‘priority’ list of eighteen such 
statutory standards has been added to two more general condi-
tions (farm land must be kept in ‘good productive’ condition, 
and there should be no signiﬁ cant decrease in total permanent 
pastoral area). All these norms will fragment member states’ farm 
3 This shift in subsidies concerns only acreage- or headage-based subsidies, i.e. 
only 30 per cent of total EU farm subsidies. The average tariff-like protection 
level is measured by the ‘producer support estimate’, which takes into account 
the various instruments of protection used by the CAP.
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markets even more – there is no such a thing as ‘uniform’ enforce-
ment of norms.
Even in the only case (rice) where the 2003 reform includes 
a serious price cut and possible market opening, it has been a 
source of fragmentation.4 The rice price cut was dictated by the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, but as EBA beneﬁ ciaries are 
not among the most efﬁ cient rice producers in the world, the EC is 
expected to introduce import quotas for rice exported from non-
EBA developing countries − one more step towards a ‘Multi-Food 
Agreement’.
So Commissioner Mandelson is only half right (or wrong) 
when he asserts that ‘Agricultural reform is painful politically. 
We know because we have done it’ (Mandelson, Geneva, 28 July 
2005).
The Doha Round: the single market is agriculture’s best friend
The Doha negotiations are absolutely critical for generating a 
single market in farm products. Focusing them on export subsi-
dies would be a dreadful mistake. It would allow EU negotiators 
to sell a rapidly depreciating asset (EU export subsidies have 
decreased by half since 1995 (European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund, annual reports)) at a grossly inﬂ ated price. 
All it would do in any case would be to bring about the trading 
environment that manufactured goods faced in the early 1950s, 
hardly evidence of real progress in terms of trade liberalisation 
4 The two other cases have involved an even more marginal product (rye) and a 
sizeable product (butter). But the fact that butter is one of the many possible 
dairy products signiﬁ cantly dampens the negative effects of the price cut, and the 
transfer of support from consumers to taxpayers is huge (OECD, 2004).
– indeed, a cost for non-EU consumers of farm products. Last but 
not least, export subsidy elimination alone will generate welfare 
losses to many developing countries since it will reduce EU farm 
supply without bringing enough incentives to increase non-EU 
agricultural supply (Anderson et al., 2005). This last point will 
play a crucial role in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations during 
2006. As the EU has de facto agreed to eliminate export subsidies, 
it should reduce tariffs and domestic support if it does not want to 
be seen as responsible for a deterioration in the welfare of devel-
oping countries − in particular of the poorest countries − or of the 
net food importers (many of them located in northern Africa or in 
the Arabian peninsula).
Almost all the welfare gains (93 per cent) from world farm 
liberalisation will come from tariff reductions, and two-thirds of 
these gains from tariff reductions undertaken by the industrial 
countries. What, then, would be the ideal tariff decrease pattern to 
be followed by the EU? Economic analysis shows that a ‘uniform’ 
level of protection (that is, the same level for all products in 
question) provides most of the gains that could be expected from 
free trade – if this level is moderate. This is because investments 
and resources are allocated according to relative domestic prices, 
which are themselves undistorted by different levels of protec-
tion, and hence aligned to the world relative prices (everything is 
in relative terms). Over time, because a uniform level of protec-
tion gives no advantage to one industry over others, it also drastic-
ally reduces opposition to further tariff reductions, as illustrated 
by the few countries that have adopted uniform tariffs since the 
1980s – Chile, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The current level of EU protection (in PSE − producer surplus 
equivalent − terms, that is, combining tariffs and subsidies) ranges 
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from roughly 20−25 per cent to several hundred per cent (sugar 
and meat). Targeting 15−20 per cent as the basis for a uniform 
level of protection at the end of the Doha Round implementa-
tion phase would thus represent a substantial liberalisation of the 
most protected sectors, and would provide a strong stimulus for 
the massive resource reallocations that must, in the long run, take 
place among farm products.
This move would imply reductions in CAP production subsi-
dies (domestic support). Removing subsidies will have to take 
account of the state of the ‘conventional ignorance’ – we cannot 
speak here of ‘conventional wisdom’ – in Europe. Some European 
farmers have said that they would accept the elimination of 
all subsidies if farm gate prices were to increase (von Reppert-
Bismarck, 2005), yet they do not realise that this would indeed be 
one of the outcomes of a substantial farm liberalisation.
Political economy issues
Politically, domestic support reduction may be more difﬁ cult 
than tariff reduction. It has a more visible distributive element 
than is the case for tariffs, which apply to all farms producing the 
same product. This difﬁ culty can be addressed by drawing a clear 
distinction between large and small farmers. Awareness-raising 
campaigns in several member states, including France (Boul-
anger, 2005), have shown that the CAP’s main beneﬁ ciaries are 
large farms – and this is the Achilles heel of the current CAP, since 
European public opinion supports the CAP largely to the extent 
that it targets small farmers.
It is often argued that the concentration of domestic support 
on large farms merely reﬂ ects the decision (perpetuated by the 
decoupled payments introduced by the 2003 reform) to deﬁ ne 
EU farm production subsidies on an acreage or headage basis 
– hence the larger the farms, the higher the subsidies. But the 
implicit assumption behind such a deﬁ nition can be challenged 
in two ways. From an efﬁ ciency perspective, one may question 
why farm subsidies have been systematically considered as subject 
to constant returns to scale, with no element of scale economies. 
From a distribution point of view, one may wonder which logic 
could support both ‘ﬂ at’ subsidy rates and increasing income tax 
rates – a more consistent pairing would be increasing tax rates 
and decreasing subsidy rates.
The Doha Round of world farm liberalisation should there-
fore not only be an opportunity to reduce European tariffs and 
domestic support. It should help small European farmers to realise 
that their interests are not the same as those of large commercial 
operators. Hence, it should help politicians reassess the respective 
roles of large and small farms, if only by taking into account the 
fact that the large farm sector is the one that is the most involved 
in world trade, and the most able to adjust to liberalisation.
A rebalancing of domestic support between large and small 
farms may put more pressure on the most free-trade-oriented 
member states since they have a higher proportion of large 
farms.5 It has escaped the attention of many observers that the 
CAP protects, on average, the farm sectors of these member states 
5 The current data on farm size may, however, provide an imperfect view of the 
situation. For instance, French regulations have systematically constrained the 
size of individual farms, but they could not prevent members of the same family 
or investment club from jointly managing their individually owned lands – hence 
French farms could be more concentrated than they seem under current data. 
Indeed, improving such information could be a helpful by-product of fuller in-
formation on the concentration of farm subsidies.
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more heavily than those of the most protectionist member states. 
This is because CAP trade barriers are deﬁ ned at the EU level, 
while their effective impact on each member state varies with 
its individual production structure: a member state producing 
mostly goods protected by high EU measures is de facto more 
‘protected’, on average, than a member state producing mostly 
moderately protected goods. As a matter of fact, EU barriers 
provide an average level of protection of more than 70 per cent 
to the farm output of free-trade-oriented member states, such as 
Britain or Sweden, compared with 59 per cent for protectionist 
France, and 55 per cent for the EC15 (see Table 2). En passant, this 
little-known fact reveals the fundamental hypocrisy (or incom-
petence) of French farm trade policy: the French people believe 
that it is designed to protect small, traditional farmers, yet their 
governments persistently allow the agenda to be driven by the 
interests of large operators, which grow the same kinds of crops 
as British farms do. Although small farmers are much more 
numerous in France than in Britain – and provide a much more 
diverse product mix than their larger counterparts – their inter-
ests have not counted for much in the French government’s farm 
trade ‘strategy’.
These higher pressures on the most free-trade-oriented 
member states can be softened, even possibly eliminated. Reduc-
tion of domestic support could be modulated by member state 
and by region. For instance, the European global subsidy reduc-
tion would be shared between member states via a Europe-wide 
formula, while the resulting member-state reductions would be 
shared between farms of different sizes according to a formula to 
be deﬁ ned by each member state. As a result, some member states 
could decide to share uniformly their own subsidy reductions 
independently of farm size, while others could do so by taking 
into account such a criterion.
Table 2 Assistance to domestic farmers, 2002
Rank Member state Level of assistance*
 absolute relative†
 1 Malta 37 67
 2 Greece 40 73
 3 Portugal 43 78
 4 Spain 43 78
 5 Hungary 44 80
 6 Italy 45 82
 7 Poland 47 85
 8 Netherlands 53 96
 9 Denmark 54 98
10 Slovakia 54 98
11 Estonia 55 100
12 Belgium 57 104
13 Czech Rep. 57 104
14 Slovenia 57 104
15 Austria 59 107
16 France 59 107
17 Latvia 59 107
18 Germany 61 111
19 Lithuania 62 113
20 Sweden 71 129
21 Britain 72 131
22 Finland 72 131
23 Luxembourg 75 136
24 Ireland 99 180
−  Cyprus n.a. n.a.
  EC-15 55 100
Sources: OECD on PSEs, EC on farm production
*Measured by the producer surplus equivalent (PSE). Member-state PSEs are EC PSEs 
by product weighted by member-state production
†EC15 = 100
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Manufacturing
In sharp contrast to the largely non-existent farm single market, 
the single market in industrial goods is relatively advanced. But 
there are still a few crucial things to do, and many essential things 
not to do.
Still a lot to do . . .
That there is still a lot to do to bring about an effective single 
market in industrial goods is revealed by the fact that price disper-
sion across member states is, on average, 20−25 per cent higher 
than within member states (even on the basis of comparable, 
highly tradable goods, and after controlling for distance and 
other speciﬁ c characteristics) (de Serres et al., 2001). This kind of 
market fragmentation is deeper in Europe than in the two other 
large OECD economies, and it ampliﬁ es the costs of protection for 
European consumers.
The ﬁ rst order of business should therefore be the elimination 
of the remaining extra-EU trade barriers, which are still substan-
tial, as documented by Table 3, in the thirty-eight sectors (out of 
a total of ninety-seven sectors) with maximum tariffs higher than 
10 per cent.
Lack of intra-EU competition also mirrors persistent and 
severe problems in regulatory matters, particularly in norms 
and standards. Roughly half of the existing 1,600 Directives deal 
with norms and standards. Moreover, the notiﬁ cations of a few 
member states well known for their transparency (Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Sweden) show that member states remain 
proliﬁ c producers of norms and standards, as shown by Table 4; 
the low ﬁ gures for the other member states may be more due to 
Table 3 Sectors with a substantial level of protection, 2004
Sectors Products Average Maximum
(HS2)   tariff (%) tariff (%)
04 Dairy products, birds’ eggs, etc. 38.4 209.9
02 Meat and edible meat offal 28.9 192.2
07 Edible vegetables 13.2 150.1
20 Preparations of vegetables 20.9 146.9
08 Edible fruit and nuts 10.4 118.1
17 Sugar and sugar confectionery 23.6 114.4
01 Live animals 20.6 107.8
10 Cereals 39.6 101.1
16 Preparations of meat 18.5 97.2
11 Products of milling industry 22.2 84.5
23 Residue from the food industry 7.0 76.0
15 Animal or vegetable fats 8.9 75.8
24 Tobacco and tobacco products 18.3 74.9
18 Cocoa and cocoa products 17.9 68.9
22 Beverages 5.7 58.6
12 Oil seeds 2.0 52.3
19 Preparations of cereals 20.3 49.6
29 Organic chemicals 4.3 39.8
37 Photographic goods 5.6 23.3
35 Albuminoidal substances 7.1 23.2
03 Fish and crustaceans, etc. 12.2 23.0
38 Miscellaneous products 5.6 22.2
87 Vehicles other than railway 6.4 22.0
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 9.6 21.1
13 Lac, gums, etc. 2.2 19.2
33 Essential oils 2.9 17.3
64 Footwear 9.9 17.0
85 Electrical machinery 2.8 14.0
09 Coffee, tea, etc. 3.1 12.5
56 Wadding, felt, etc. 6.1 12.0
61 Articles of apparel (knitted/crocheted) 11.7 12.0
62 Articles of apparel (non-knitted/crocheted) 11.6 12.0
63 Other made-up textiles 10.0 12.0
69 Ceramic products 4.8 12.0
91 Clocks and watches 3.8 11.2
70 Glass and glassware 4.8 11.0
06 Live trees 6.0 10.9
76 Aluminium and articles thereof 6.3 10.0
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review, 2004
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reporting problems than to regulatory lethargy. These problems, 
which are very similar in nature to those faced in services, require 
the same approach as that suggested below for services − that is, 
nurturing a ‘culture of evaluation’ that aims to regularly assess the 
real value of the enforced norms and standards at both the EU and 
member-state levels.
. . .  and a lot not to do
In addition to these positive steps, it is also important to counsel a 
certain degree of ‘masterly inactivity’ in other areas. One example 
is the need to resist the emerging calls for a ‘strategic casino-and-
yogurt policy’, which would aim to impose limits on takeovers 
in order to protect some ﬁ rms deemed essential to the national 
economy. For instance, a French decree published on 31 December 
2005 allows the French government to block foreign takeovers in 
eleven designated sectors related to national security, one of them 
being casinos. This surrealistic casino case, the strong French 
government pressures in the Taittinger (champagne) and Danone 
(yogurt) cases, and the nationalistic reactions to the Arcelor-
Mittal (steel) case generate suspicions about the real limits of 
capital mobility in Europe. In the past, the EU has already faced 
such calls for internal liberalisation accompanied by more aggres-
sive and autarkic trade policies (Henderson, 1991).
The threat is all the more serious because nowadays there are 
plenty of other opportunities to invest all over the world, meaning 
that the member states playing with the strategic casino-and-
yogurt policy may pay a high price for it – in terms of forgone 
investments leaving for better skies. These costs are ampliﬁ ed by 
the fact that the member states where this policy has some appeal 
face high debt and mounting public deﬁ cits, meaning that their 
governments’ hands are largely tied, and hence they may lose 
long-term credibility by ultimately doing nothing – except awak-
ening and ﬂ attering nationalistic feelings.
A crucial condition – too often forgotten – for beneﬁ cial inter-
national investment is uniformly open markets, so that interna-
tional investors are not induced to invest in the most protected 
sectors of a country. In this respect, the EU’s increasing tendency 
to use contingent protection as a back-door route to protection is 
very worrying – all the more so when one knows the vast capaci-
ties of such protection to hit speciﬁ c targets and distort economic 
Table 4  Notifi cation of EC norms and standards to the WTO, 
1995−2003
  Notifi cations
 Number Number per million euros GDP
  1995−99 2000−03  1995−99 2000−03
Austria 5 0  27 0
Belgium 150 57 709 230
Britain 12 18 14 12
Denmark 133 54 965 315
Finland 24 13 240 99
France 59 37 49 26
Germany 14 0 7 0
Greece 0 0 0 0
Ireland 1 0 20 0
Italy 0 3 0 3
Luxembourg 4 0 290 0
Netherlands 459 105 1,447 261
Portugal 0 0 0 0
Spain 34 32 76 51
Sweden 84 49  443 189
EC15 167 61  25 7
Total 1,144 429  86 25
Source: WTO, Trade Policy Review, 2004
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decisions in detail. Since mid-1995, the situation has seriously 
deteriorated. First, the number of anti-dumping measures in force 
increased by 56 per cent between 1991 and 2003, and this does not 
even include the ‘grey’ agreements between ﬁ rms aiming to keep 
import prices high and/or imported quantities low under anti-
dumping measures. Interestingly, member states do not seem to 
have the same interest in anti-dumping policies. Table 5 shows two 
apparently stable coalitions of member states, one that routinely 
supports the imposition of anti-dumping measures, and one that 
opposes them – a delicate balance that allows the Commission 
to magnify its grip on the whole process (Evenett and Vermulst, 
2004). It remains to be seen whether the latest enlargement will 
change this situation. One may fear that the new member states 
are more sympathetic to anti-dumping measures (at least in the 
short run) because the competitive pressures on some of their 
industries may have increased since their accession.
Second, this steady increase in anti-dumping has not 
prevented the EU from using a steel safeguard (2002) as a 
substitute for the many anti-dumping cases already ﬁ led by that 
industry. The EU steel safeguard has proved to be worse than any 
anti-dumping case, in every possible respect. Its import coverage 
was thirty to ﬁ fty times the coverage of an average anti-dumping 
case. Its capacity to discriminate among foreign producers was as 
severe as anti-dumping, because it imposed individual tariff-rate 
quotas on exporting countries, each with very few (often only one) 
domestic steel ﬁ rms. Its capacity to generate a domino effect of 
similar measures around the world was much greater than that 
of anti-dumping duties – within the space of a few months, the 
EU’s actions spawned a worldwide web of steel safeguards. The 
WTO’s legal conditionalities on safeguard use (existence of an 
import surge, unforeseen developments, serious injury) were 
blatantly misused. For instance, the alleged motive of a potential 
import surge caused by the US steel safeguard deliberately ignored 
the persistent Chinese boom since 1995 and declining excess 
capacity since 1999 (Messerlin, 2004). That a European steel 
ﬁ rm (VoestAlpine) could proclaim the year 2001/02 as ‘the best 
business year ever in the company’s history’, and the year 2002/03 
Table 5  Voting records and views expressed by EU member states on 
anti-dumping matters, 1991−2003
   Views on anti-dumping matters  Votes on anti-dumping duties
Rank* Member Total Percentage Total Percentage
  number of in favour of number of in favour of
  views restrictive votes defi nitive
  expressed measures expressed duties
   or steps 
   leading to 
   restrictive 
   measures      
 1 Germany 27 0.0  4 0.0
 2 Sweden 20 0.0 3 0.0
 3 Denmark 20 0.0 2 0.0
 4 Finland 16 6.3 3 0.0
 5 Netherlands 24 8.3 3 0.0
 6 Britain 32 15.6 5 0.0
 7 Ireland 21 23.8 3 0.0
 8 Luxembourg 14 14.3 5 20.0
 9 Austria 19 26.3 6 33.3
10 Belgium 16 37.5 4 75.0
11 France 22 95.5 6 83.3
12 Spain 20 85.0 5 100.0
13 Greece 13 92.3 5 100.0
14 Italy 20 95.0 5 100.0
15 Portugal 19 100.0  5 100.0
Source: Evenett and Vermulst, 2004
*Countries are ranked by increasing percentages of votes and views, and decreasing 
number of votes expressed.
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as the second-best one, may be the shortest, most accurate and 
most damning assessment of the impact of this safeguard.
EU contingent protection has made one more step in the 
wrong direction with the measures recently imposed on Chinese 
clothing. The measures were adopted even though EU consumer 
prices of Chinese clothing did not seem to have fallen much, 
implying that intermediaries have pocketed the gap with the 
lower Chinese export prices. Moreover, there is the persistent 
rumour that EU imports of clothing from the whole world have 
not changed very much, meaning that what happened was mostly 
just a change in the sources of European imports.
The worst news of all is that the EU’s protection has taken 
the form of ‘voluntary export restraints’ (VERs), an instrument 
banned by the Uruguay Round. There is a serious feeling of 
déjà vu for those who observed the myriad of VERs imposed 
on a never-ending number of Japanese products over the three 
decades following Japan’s accession to the GATT (the WTO’s 
predecessor). A parallel between China and Japan naturally has 
many limits. But this is not overly reassuring. In the Japanese 
case, rents were fully transferred to Japanese ﬁ rms because the 
national bureaucracy was not corrupt. This feature ultimately 
helped stop the use of VERs: as time went on, Japanese ﬁ rms 
used these rents to upgrade their products, making European 
(and US) ﬁ rms learn the hard way that VERs were not a solution, 
but a problem. By contrast, Chinese regional and national 
bureaucracies will take their share of the rents. Internal conﬂ icts 
over rent-grabbing may impede the efﬁ ciency gains of Chinese 
ﬁ rms, leading them to ﬁ ght for retali ation against the EU (in 
sharp contrast with the unfailing cooperation of the Japanese).
What is needed is much less a rewrite of the WTO rules on 
contingent protection than an effort to assess the impact of EU 
contingent protection on the EU’s own economy. All these cases 
have the same Achilles heel: they involve very narrow vested 
interests. This allows us to shift away from the general debate on 
‘protection versus free trade’ – a debate too general to convince 
unconvinced people – towards a series of cost−beneﬁ t analyses 
on a case-by-case basis. The advantage of such an approach is that 
it highlights the net costs for the EU, at the same time as setting 
them against the beneﬁ ts appropriated by ‘the happy few’. It is 
also a natural starting point for developing non-protectionist 
solutions to possible adjustment problems. Contingent protec-
tion cases therefore offer an excellent opportunity to assess public 
policy measures – what I refer to as a ‘culture of evaluation’ below. 
Such a task cannot be undertaken by the Commission itself, since 
it has instigated the measures in question. It is up to independent 
European think tanks to reveal the untold side of these cases.
The single market in services: the promised land?
The single market in services is clearly generating more and 
deeper fears than the single market in goods – and not only in 
France. Polls capture these fears when they shift from questions 
on freer trade to those on globalisation. For instance, a majority 
(55 per cent, a ﬁ gure amazingly close to the French ‘Non’ vote) of 
the same French people who support freer trade so strongly none-
theless have a ‘very or somewhat unfavourable opinion of global-
isation’. The ﬁ gure for Germany is not so different (48 per cent), 
in contrast to those for Britain and the USA (39 and 36 per cent, 
respectively), as one might expect.
If not overcome, these fears will be very costly for European 
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consumers. The welfare gains to be expected from an open single 
market in services are huge – indeed, much larger than those from 
goods – for three mutually reinforcing reasons. First, the services 
sector itself is huge: 70 per cent of European GDP, almost three 
times the size of manufacturing. Second, the level of protection 
in services is much higher than in goods – a crucial point, since 
welfare costs grow much faster than the level of protection (the 
rule of thumb is that they are a square function of the protec-
tion level). Most available estimates of the level of protection in 
services are within the 15−25 per cent range, when expressed in 
ad valorem tariff-like terms, compared with roughly 10 per cent 
in goods. But because they generally cover broad services sectors, 
such as ‘telecom services’ or ‘distribution’, these ﬁ gures do not 
include all the devils-in-the-detail that characterise protection in 
services. When looking at services on a disaggregated basis, anec-
dotal evidence suggests a level of protection often above 50 per 
cent when expressed in tariff-like terms.6
Finally, protection in services occurs not only at the member-
state level, but also at the sub-national level – a big difference 
when compared with the goods case. For instance, opening a large 
retail store or a hotel in France is a successive mix of barriers at the 
town, département and national levels. This much higher degree of 
market fragmentation exacerbates the possibility of nurturing a 
myriad of local collusions, creates repeated costs for new entrants, 
and magniﬁ es the costs of protection.
6 Lack of systematic evidence prevents us from providing estimates of the costs of 
protection in services comparable to those available for protection in goods.
Harmonisation and mutual recognition: ineffective instruments
So far, the Directives adopted for liberalising services have 
attempted to address people’s fears using two instruments. 
Harmonisation seemed apt to eliminate fears of ‘unfair’ competi-
tion, while mutual recognition seemed a workable approximation 
of harmonisation. These two approaches have, however, proved 
to be largely ineffective in opening markets.
Harmonising existing domestic regulations by negotiating 
common European regulations has proved to be very costly (some 
Directives have required more than ﬁ fteen years of negotiation), 
too easy to reverse (since a harmonised regulation can be quickly 
‘de-harmonised’ by member states imposing additional ‘prac-
tices’ when implementing the harmonised text), and in any case 
has provided no guarantee of efﬁ cient regulation. The recent EU 
enlargement makes these handicaps even more severe: the more 
negotiators there are, the more hopeless it is to try to get them to 
agree on a single, harmonised rule.
The mutual-recognition approach was seen as the appropriate 
answer to the harmonisation impasse. It consists in harmonising 
only the ‘key’ provisions to be included in the new common regu-
lation, and imposing ‘mutual recognition’ for the rest of the provi-
sions existing in individual member states’ regulations. Its beneﬁ ts 
have, however, been much more limited than expected, for two 
reasons. First, they depend critically on the relative im portance of 
the mutual-recognition component as compared with the harmo-
nisation component. The negotiations among member states 
which determine this balance have systematically inﬂ ated the 
latter to the detriment of the former.
Second, the beneﬁ ts from mutual recognition increase with 
the diversity of the regulations involved: the more diverse the 
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 regulations of the countries concerned are, the more numerous 
can be the varieties of competitive pressures that a mutual-recog-
nition agreement can offer. Contrary to what happened with 
trade in goods, however, the single market in services did not 
beneﬁ t from a genuine multilateral services liberalisation, and 
from the wider diversity it could offer. Once again, the recent EU 
enlargement can only amplify these problems by involving more 
negotiating member states, without necessarily getting a more 
substantial diversity of regulations.
The Services Directive
In this context, the proposed Services Directive (hereafter ‘the 
Directive’) tabled by the Commission constitutes the ﬁ rst serious 
attempt to create an effective single market in services by going 
beyond harmonisation and mutual recognition. It has faced 
unprecedented opposition, however, which needs to be understood 
and properly assessed in order to deﬁ ne a workable long-term 
strategy. (What follows focuses on the Directive initial proposal, 
since the Directive has not yet been adopted by the Council.)
The ﬁ rst serious attempt to create an effective single market in services
An effective single market in services is not a simple matter – after 
all, it is not yet completed even in a fully ﬂ edged federation like 
the USA. The creation of such a market needs to satisfy three basic 
conditions; the Services Directive indeed does so.
The ﬁ rst condition is to have the widest possible sectoral 
coverage. This feature provides for the most ‘uniform’ level of 
protection possible across different services sectors, a point that 
has attracted surprisingly little attention so far. Service providers 
whose inputs are modestly protected but whose outputs are highly 
protected beneﬁ t from a level of ‘effective’ protection much higher 
than the ‘apparent’ level of protection imposed on their outputs 
alone. For instance, such effective levels of protection (expressed 
in tariff-like terms) in the French audiovisual services range from 
less than 8 per cent in the movie theatre segment to more than 70 
per cent in the broadcasting segment, and more than 100 per cent 
in the movie production segments (Messerlin, 2003).
Indeed, the Directive covers a huge share of GDP (50 per cent 
according to the Commission), much more than all the existing 
Directives on services put together, and twice that of the goods 
sector. The uniform protection it would help bring about would 
have the same beneﬁ cial effects in services as those highlighted 
above for agriculture and manufacturing.7 Its dynamic effects on 
market structures and innovation may also bring the single market 
more within the reach of the small and medium-sized service 
providers that have been largely excluded from it to date. Sectoral 
services liberalisation is easier to manage for large ﬁ rms than for 
small and medium-sized ones. For instance, large ﬁ rms could cope 
with the absence of a single market in legal services more easily 
than smaller ﬁ rms by hiring the services of large legal ﬁ rms with 
worldwide operations, a move out of reach of most smaller ﬁ rms. 
If small and medium-sized ﬁ rms are an essential source of innova-
tion, their fuller integration into the single market would boost 
7 The previous Directives could not offer these gains because their narrow sectoral 
coverage lowered the effective level of protection of the services they liberalised, 
but increased the effective level of protection of other services. They have thereby 
systematically distorted the production pattern of services, since ﬁ rms operating 
in liberalised sectors have incentives to shift their activities into more protected 
sectors.
e u r o p e  a f t e r  t h e  ‘ n o’  v o t e s
42 43
e u r o p e  a f t e r  t h e  ‘ n o’  v o t e s :  m a p p i n g  a  n e w  e c o n o m i c  pa t h
innovation, and hence variety, in European services, as has been 
the case for goods.
The second condition for an effective single market in services 
is the largest possible freedom of establishment (that is, invest-
ment in agencies, branches or subsidiaries in the other member 
states’ services markets). Too often, host member states still 
infringe EU rules and impose ‘requirements’ on investors, limiting 
entry to such an extent that consolidations in still-fragmented 
markets turn into anti-competitive strategies – making entry more 
difﬁ cult.
Indeed, the initial proposal of the Directive addresses this issue 
in two steps. First, it ‘systematises’ the rulings of the European 
Court of Justice by providing a list of host member states’ require-
ments that the court has consistently banned over time, and hence 
for which there is no risk of the jurisprudence being reversed in the 
future. For instance, the proposal prohibits requirements based 
on nationality, conditions on the maximum number of member 
states in which a ﬁ rm can be established and the case-by-case 
application of an ‘economic test’ in order to be registered (Article 
14). By banning these requirements, the Directive proposal elim-
inates the need for ﬁ rms to bring new suits before the court on a 
one-by-one basis, thereby decreasing transaction costs massively. 
Second, the Directive proposal lists another set of requirements, 
such as quantitative or territorial restrictions, requirements ﬁ xing 
a minimum number of employees, etc., which have not been 
systematically condemned by the court because they can make 
economic sense in speciﬁ c circumstances (Article 15). As a result, 
the proposal makes the elimination or the adjustment of these 
provisions conditional on an assessment procedure of ‘mutual 
evaluation’ (Article 41). This is a very interesting procedure to the 
extent that it deﬁ nes a dynamic process of liberalisation as well as 
a liberalisation programme per se.
The last condition necessary for an effective single market in 
services is the liberalisation of ‘cross-border trade’ in services, be it 
the ‘physical’ trade of services (such as legal advice sent by fax by 
a foreign expert to a domestic operator) or the trading of services 
through labour movement (such as a non-permanent sojourn of 
experts from one member state in another member state). Cross-
border trade under a ‘principle of country of origin’ (hereafter 
PCO) regime would invigorate ﬁ rms’ competitive behaviour by 
injecting a new layer of competition, namely competition between 
member states’ regulations. When constrained by host-country 
regulations, investors in services from other member states are 
induced to follow the prevailing behaviour in the market in which 
they are investing (after all, this behaviour has been tested by 
host-country ﬁ rms and found to be proﬁ table in that particular 
environment). In sharp contrast, exporting ﬁ rms under the PCO 
can design, more often and/or more strongly, a strategy different 
from the one followed by host-country ﬁ rms, because they can use 
their home-country legal environment to exploit their comparat ive 
advantages.
The tabled proposal does indeed open cross-border trade by 
stating that ‘member states shall ensure that [services] providers 
are subject only to the national provisions of their member state 
of origin’ (Article 16). The PCO boils down to adopting the mutual 
recognition principle for all the provisions of the regulations in 
question – there is no longer any need to negotiate the harmonisa-
tion component.
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Assessing the opposition to the Directive: rent-seekers strike back
The Directive came under strong attack during the French refer-
endum campaign. Anti-market NGOs were, predictably, very 
vocal against it. The French president chose to placate them by 
declaring that the Directive was ﬁ nished, even while it was still 
under examination by the European Parliament. A French press 
largely ignorant (and eager to remain so) rarely reported accurate 
information on the basic facts that were at the root of people’s 
main fears (such as the fact that the Directive kept intact member 
states’ individual rules governing national labour markets, 
including minimum wages, work conditions, diplomas, etc.). All 
this has given the impression that the opposition to the Directive 
was concentrated in France. But this is inaccurate.
Opposition to the Directive is much broader because its 
wide sectoral scope (a key asset from an economic perspective) 
has produced heavy political costs by uniting a huge number of 
monopolies or collusive ﬁ rms all over Europe. The Hearings of 
the European Parliament on the Directive in November 2004 
(well before the French campaign) provide a fascinating view of 
the Europe-wide unholy alliance between the supporters of public 
monopolies (see, for instance, Jennar, 2005) and those of the many 
narrow private monopolies under threat, particularly in the areas 
of professional and legal services – one of the best illustrations is 
the case of the French huissiers, notaires and avocats près les Cours 
suprêmes (bailiffs, notaries and barristers of the Supreme Courts) 
(Guillaume, 2005).
At the same time, the silence of the Directive’s potential 
beneﬁ ciaries has been as deafening as the vocal opposition, and 
it is important to understand it. Large ﬁ rms might get what 
they want most, namely the prohibition of the most blatant 
barriers to foreign establishment (Article 14). But they may have 
conﬂ icting interests with regard to the second list (Article 15), to 
the extent that some of the listed requirements might actually 
play a positive role in their corporate strategies. And they may 
have only a marginal interest in the cross-border trade to the 
extent that, as argued above, they have been able to cope with 
the existing barriers to trade in services by investing directly in 
the various member states. Small and medium-sized ﬁ rms have 
similar incentives to large ﬁ rms with respect to foreign establish-
ment, although these incentives may be weaker, since investing in 
other EU markets is generally more costly for them. By contrast, 
they may have stronger interests in opening cross-border trade 
and adopting the PCO, except insofar as they may be beneﬁ ting 
from the current barriers (for instance, by hiring Polish plumbers 
or tilers in the French and German grey markets). Few small and 
medium-sized ﬁ rms seem to have developed an export strategy, 
however, and many of them have not been aware of the Directive 
proposal, and its potential beneﬁ ts for them.
As usual, the strongest supporters of the Directive should have 
been consumers – be they households or ﬁ rms. But consumers 
have been torn between the gains in terms of price cuts or variety 
increases and the fears of losing in terms of information or legal 
protection in the case of defective services. In sum, the Directive is 
facing an uphill struggle, not only because services are a source of 
cosy monopolies or collusive oligopolies much more often than is 
the case for goods, but also because most suppliers and consumers 
ﬁ nd it more difﬁ cult to assess the net welfare effects of services 
liberalisation.
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Lines of action
The combination of a strong opposition and a lack of support has 
differing impacts on the three conditions required for an effective 
single market in services.
First, the opposition may reduce the Directive’s sectoral scope. 
This is a frequent, though unfortunate, turn of events in relation to 
liberalisation policies. If the ﬁ nal proposal of the Directive covers 
a substantial share (say 25 per cent) of GDP, however, it would 
still represent a huge step forward, equivalent to all goods market 
liberalisation over the last ﬁ fty years. Moreover, if the expected 
beneﬁ ts from the Directive materialise, they will induce use of the 
Directive as a blueprint for liberalising other services, including 
those covered by the existing Directives – a perspective that has 
already triggered pre-emptive strikes against the Directive from 
some sectors, such as ﬁ nancial services. As in any incomplete 
trade liberalisation, the thing to do is to look at the most blatant 
remaining cases of protection, and estimate their welfare costs for 
consumers.
Another possibility is to envisage a ‘two-speed’ introduction 
of the Directive, with a ﬁ rst group of member states adopting 
and implementing the Directive provisions as they are, the other 
member states being free to join the ﬁ rst group whenever they 
wish, on the existing conditions (i.e. no renegotiations to accom-
modate latecomers). Since this approach is a severe breach of the 
consensus-based method adopted so far by the EU, it may require 
some a priori deﬁ nition of the ‘ﬁ rst group’ in order to be accepted. 
The best deﬁ nition could be provided by a concept that was used 
in the ﬁ rst years of the WTO – the ‘critical mass’; that is, a number 
of countries large enough to represent a share of imports or value-
added higher than a predetermined threshold.
A ﬁ nal possibility is to buttress intra-EU liberalisation with 
multilateral negotiations. As underlined above, GATT negoti-
ations made much more palatable to member states intra-EU 
deals that were initially impossible within the EU forum alone. 
The same could be done with the services negotiations in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), all the more 
so because it is now clear that for a substantial number of devel-
oping countries (including key ones in terms of negotiations, such 
as India) opening trade in services will bring far more welfare 
gains than opening trade in goods. The GATS legal framework 
is much weaker than that of the GATT, however, making it difﬁ -
cult to bring about substantial concessions in services in a multi-
lateral environment, as illustrated by the current Doha Round 
negotiations.
The damage would be much more serious if the price to be 
paid for the Services Directive were to be a Directive on ‘public 
and/or universal services’ (instead of reduced sectoral scope). 
Such a development would insulate small but critical sectors 
from competitive pressures for a long time to come, and would 
bring with it the likelihood of distortions spreading to other 
sectors through cross-subsidisation and network-based foreclos-
ures. Preventing it is therefore crucial. It would mean not only 
estimating the costs of the distortions artiﬁ cially created by such 
a Directive, but also highlighting the gains from alternatives to 
public monopolies for providing these types of services.
Second, criticisms have been moderate on the foreign estab-
lishment dimension of the Directive proposal. In fact, foreign 
establishment seems to be viewed more often than not as labour-
friendly (foreign ﬁ rms tend to use member-state nationals to 
develop their services in the host state). This is consistent with the 
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fact that the successive campaigns against ‘offshoring’ in services 
have not been successful so far, despite many efforts by NGOs.
There is, however, a need to strengthen the procedure of 
mutual evaluation that the Directive introduces for assessing 
the requirements on foreign establishment. The current proce-
dure is weak because it limits the assessment task to just three 
criteria – whether the requirement under examination is  non-
 discriminatory, whether it is justiﬁ ed by an overriding reason 
related to the public interest, and whether it is proportional to its 
objective. These criteria are the ones used by the court in exam-
ining a requirement pertaining to the second list. The problem is 
that the Directive leaves the evaluation of these criteria to (unde-
ﬁ ned) national authorities and to the Commission. This is a recipe 
for volatile and inconsistent decisions, all the more so because this 
procedure can pose a serious threat to vested interests, and hence 
trigger strong opposition. Promoting a vibrant ‘culture of evalu-
ation’ is therefore crucial – the idea is developed below in more 
detail.
Finally, opposition to the Directive has focused on the PCO. 
Many of the criticisms against the PCO were fuelled by confu-
sion, if not by outright disinformation. In particular, opening 
cross-border trade was understood by many people as equivalent 
to eliminating member states’ regulations on national labour 
markets (minimum wages, work conditions, diplomas, etc.), even 
though the Directive proposal makes it crystal-clear that it does 
not deal with such rules.
To restore some sanity to the debate, one should recall that 
the Directive is not the ﬁ rst one to use the PCO. Both the 1989 and 
1997 Directives on Television without Frontiers require foreign 
TV channels to follow the regulations of their country of origin, 
including the sacrosanct regulations on broadcasting quotas. 
Why, then, did the PCO attract almost no attention in such a 
sensitive sector as audiovisuals, whereas it touched a raw nerve 
in the case of the Services Directive? Two reasons seem para-
mount. First, technology made it hard to ban the PCO in audio-
visuals – any other rule would mean jamming radio or TV waves, 
hardly acceptable in democracies. There are no such technological 
and political constraints in the services covered by the Directive. 
Second, ‘natural’ transaction costs (languages, tastes) are strong 
impediments limiting cross-border trade in broadcasting. Such 
natural costs are lower for most of the services covered by the 
Directive, which then represents a much greater potential threat 
to vested interests. There is also, however, a deeper explanation 
for the outcry against the Directive.
A regime of regulatory competition requires a vibrant culture of 
evaluation
There have already been instances of regulatory competition in 
Europe. What is new in the Directive is the institutionalisation 
of that process: it effectively makes it part of the EU legal regime. 
This change has triggered two different types of systemic fears.
First, regulatory competition clashes with the idea of ‘conver-
gence’ in regulations. Convergence is a weak form of harmonisa-
tion – the vague hope that in the long run there will be a unique 
set of regulations for a given service sector in the EU. This hope 
prevails in most EU circles because it gives EU decision-makers 
something to make decisions about. It is also a commonly held 
view among European populations because it looks reassuring, in 
particular when national governments have a tendency to let their 
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citizens believe that ‘convergence’ in fact implies nothing more 
than an extension of their own national standards to the rest of 
the EU. 
By contrast, a regime of regulatory competition offers no 
systematic outcomes in terms of convergence, and above all no 
apparent guarantee for individual citizens that the standards 
applied in their own country will not change. It may lead to regu-
latory convergence in some cases, but also to a wider range of 
regulatory varieties in other cases. In modern economies, ﬁ rms 
compete by differentiating their products or services at least 
as much as by charging different prices for similar products or 
services. There is no a priori reason why member states will not 
behave in the same way when designing their regulations, and this 
is a perspective that does not sit easily with the idea of integration 
as uniﬁ cation (often understood as ‘uniformity’).
Second, regulatory competition is often associated with the 
idea of a ‘race to the bottom’. This is fuelled, in fact, by a twin 
lack of trust. On the one hand, most Europeans certainly do not 
trust the governments of the other member states. The recent EU 
enlargement has exacerbated this mistrust, with the new member 
states still suffering from their past: conservative ‘Wessies’ are 
suspicious of these reformed communists, while leftist ‘Wessies’ 
cannot ﬁ nd it in their hearts to forgive these countries for aban-
doning the communist ‘dream’ and shifting to a market economy. 
The good news is that this situation can be expected to improve 
over time, in particular if there is a big success story to focus on, a 
kind of ‘central European Ireland’. The bad news is that the second 
lack of trust generating fears of a ‘race to the bottom’ is potentially 
much more serious: many Europeans simply do not trust their own 
governments. And unfortunately, their governments do not seem 
to be doing much to remedy the situation, in particular as they let 
the distance between rhetoric and action grow (see the ‘strategic 
casino-and-yogurt policy’ above).
Overcoming fears of a race to the bottom cannot be achieved 
by a general argument about the beneﬁ ts of regulatory competi-
tion. Such arguments convince only the already convinced. What 
is needed is a culture of evaluation relying on the best and most 
systematic cost−beneﬁ t analysis of concrete cases. By showing that 
any liberalisation brings global gains but leaves some net losers, 
a culture of evaluation shifts the spotlight to two key questions: 
is there a need for an adjustment policy, and, if yes, what would 
be the best compensation instrument to use? Nowadays, there 
is a strong tendency to ignore the ﬁ rst question, and to assume 
that any net loser deserves adjustment support – an approach 
that imposes excessive constraints on a market economy. The 
answer to this question should not be a systematic yes, however, 
but rather should ﬂ ow from a careful examination of each case, 
including from a political perspective. For instance, the question 
of whether large farmers who have been subsidised by the poorest 
consumers and by taxpayers during the last four decades have a 
‘right’ to be compensated deserves a thorough debate.
If the culture of evaluation is such a necessary condition for 
getting an effective single market in services, then who should 
generate this culture? Of course, there is a role for governments, 
and some countries have indeed taken this approach, such as 
Australia with the Productivity Commission (Banks, 2005), or the 
USA with the Ofﬁ ce of Management and Budget (Hahn and Litan, 
2004).
The EU situation, however, is clearly far from satisfactory in 
this respect. Table 6 shows how far (not how effectively) member 
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Table 6  Regulatory impact assessment: the situation amongst 
the member states, 2005       
 Does a Does a  Are RIAs Are Do  Is there a Consultation Do Does Are there Does an Total* Rank
 better specifi c obligatory? alternative RIA coordinating part formal direct tests of exemption  
 regulation RIA  instruments guidelines body of RIA? consultation stakeholder impact on exist 
 programme policy  considered? exist? for RIAs?  procedures consultation SMEs?† for SMEs?  
 exist? exist?      exist? exist?    
Britain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 9.1 1
Denmark 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 9.1 2
Poland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 0 3 8.5 3
Latvia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 8.2 4
Sweden 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 8.2 5
Finland 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 0 0 7.6 6
Austria 3 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 7.3 7
Netherlands 3 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 3 1 3 6.7 8
Hungary 3 1 3 0 0 3 1 1 3 3 3 6.4 9
Luxembourg 3 0 3 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 3 6.4 10
Germany 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 4.5 11
Italy 1 3 0 1 3 1 1 0 3 1 0 4.2 12
Estonia 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3.6 13
Lithuania 0 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.6 14
Spain 3 1 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.6 15
Malta 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 3 3.0 16
Belgium 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2.4 17
Czech Rep. 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.1 18
Ireland 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2.1 19
Greece 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1.5 20
Slovenia 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 21
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.3 22
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 23
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 24
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 25
EC15 2.1 1.4 1.1 1.3 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.2 4.7 --
EC25 2.1 1.5 1.1 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.3 4.7 --
Source: European Commission, Communication COM(2005) 97 fi nal, March 2005.      
*Total scores are divided by 33 (maximum indicator) and multiplied by 10
†Small and medium-sized enterprises            
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states have introduced ‘regulatory impact assessments’ (RIAs) by 
giving indicators varying from a ‘no’ answer to the question raised 
in the heading (0) to a fully ﬂ edged RIA answer (3). Only ten 
member states (seven for the EC15, three for the EC10) have intro-
duced RIAs in any signiﬁ cant way (with a score higher than 60 per 
cent), and, ironically, the EC10 score is better than the EC15 score. 
More worrying than the overall picture is the existence of a small 
number of truly awful performers, such as France. The situation 
at the Commission level is not much better. There has been an 
annual average of 25−30 RIAs undertaken by the Commission, a 
number that compares poorly with the average annual production 
of 60 Directives and 1,200 basic legal documents for the 1990s. 
Moreover, most of these RIAs do not fulﬁ l the minimum condi-
tions for being really useful (Vibert, 2004; Messerlin, 2006).
As a result, the vibrant culture of evaluation needed for an 
effective single market in services would require active inde-
pendent research centres and think tanks, all the more so in light 
of the public’s growing mistrust of their own governments. It is 
striking that such institutions – which have been instrumental 
in the bipartisan changes of approach observed in the USA and 
Britain since the 1970s – are largely missing from continental 
Europe.
Trade policy as foreign policy
As noted above, French and Dutch voters have clearly rejected the 
EU as a ‘super-state’. But paradoxically, many of the same voters 
see the EU as a ‘superpower’. Europe’s ‘superpower’ is not now, 
and will not at any time soon, be based on a foreign policy with 
worldwide goals and means (an army). It can rely only on the 
use of trade policy. During the last decade, the EU has mostly 
conceived of its trade policy in a mercantilist way by slowly 
returning to its age-old ‘addiction’ to discrimination (Wolf, 1994), 
despite its ofﬁ cial allegiance to multilateralism. This drift has 
taken the form of bilateral preferential agreements, often qualiﬁ ed 
as WTO-plus because they extract concessions from EC trading 
partners (on TRIPs, investment, political commitments, etc.) that 
these partners would never have dared to make in the WTO. This 
drift has been made easier by a similar move from the USA, hence 
this emerging coalition of the two ‘world aristocrats’ confronting 
increasingly impatient ‘world bourgeois’ – the Brazils, Indias and 
Chinas.
Trade policy could be conceived in a much more generous 
perspective, whereby the EU would try to be a ‘benevolent’ trading 
partner − that is to say, a partner convinced that the extension 
and exercise of economic freedom make for closer economic 
integration, both within and across national boundaries (Hend-
erson, 2001; Wolf, 2004). What follows suggests that the two 
key pending issues – the EU’s relations with Turkey and with the 
Afrian−Caribbean−Paciﬁ c countries (ACPs) – would beneﬁ t from 
the second approach.
Freeing Turkey
Turkey’s accession to the EU is facing strong opposition in many 
European quarters. To appease mounting fears or even outright 
hostility, EU governments are becoming increasingly rigid about 
the conditions to be imposed on Turkey. As a result, successive 
Turkish governments will face a more and more difﬁ cult chal-
lenge: no democratically elected government can easily survive 
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twelve years of negotiations without a strong commitment from 
its partners. All this is related to the fact that some member states 
long to have much more integrated societies than others (at least 
ideally), and that most member states perceive the EU as a polit-
ical endeavour as much as an economic entity – and hence do not 
envisage the possibility that a political entity including only some 
member states could develop. Such an uneasy situation is a sure 
recipe for suspicion and bitterness on both sides – and ultimately 
for a disastrous failure for both parties.
Promising some ‘preferential’ status in the future (if the EU 
membership option is abandoned) while keeping Turkey tied to 
the EU through the current customs union agreement is not the 
solution. In the EU perspective, a customs union is an immediate 
loss of sovereignty in trade matters which is balanced out in the 
longer run by a seat at the Council table, allowing for shared sover-
eignty on all matters of common interest. Not only does Turkey 
have no certainty as to its future seat at the Council, but it cannot 
even derive the full beneﬁ ts of its current customs union with the 
EU for the following reason: it cannot duplicate the preferential 
agreements that the EU is concluding with many other countries 
because those same countries are dragging their feet in granting 
Turkey the same concessions they have granted the EU. Indeed, 
these problems contribute to the unsatisfactory functioning of the 
current EU−Turkey customs union.
If the EU feels unable both to make a distinction between its 
economic and its political goals, and to make a ﬁ rm commitment 
in favour of Turkish accession in the next couple of years, it should 
take the initiative in some other way. Nothing would be more 
dangerous than an increasingly poisonous atmosphere.
A ﬁ rst option would be for the EU to give Turkey back its 
full sovereignty in trade matters by offering the transformation 
of the current customs union agreement into a free-trade agree-
ment. Such a solution raises a few technical issues, most notably 
the regime of rules of origin and of contingent protection, 
which could be resolved with some good will from both sides. 
Moreover, this solution keeps all the economic incentives neces-
sary for a continu ous rapid growth of the Turkish economy – the 
most crucial ingredient for a Turkish society becoming closer to 
European societies. The success of this option would critically 
depend on whether it would be seen as the signal that the EU trusts 
Turkey’s capacity to go on its own in the direction desired by the 
EU – and not as a backward step by the EU. A Turkey treated in 
this way could provide more robust – because more internally 
rooted – reforms, and might be a more powerful example for the 
Middle East region than a Turkey under anxious and acrimonious 
scrutiny by EU governments. Its accession – if ﬁ nally decided by 
the two parties – will be a lot easier.
The second option would be for the EU member states to make 
a much clearer distinction between the economic and political 
aspects of the European endeavour – Turkey being seen as part of 
the ﬁ rst aspect, but not of the second, along with quite a number 
of other member states. This second option will critically depend 
on the ability to reformulate the political contours of Europe 
– deﬁ nitely not an easy task (Gould, 2005). It may also depend 
on an improved situation in the Middle East, which may induce 
Turkey to play a pivotal role between the EU and the Middle East 
countries, without being too ﬁ rmly attached to either of these two 
regions.
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Freeing the African−Caribbean−Pacifi c countries (ACPs)
The EU is negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
with the ACPs, arbitrarily regrouped by the EU into six regions 
(four in Africa, one in the Caribbean and one in the Paciﬁ c). The 
EU invokes two motives for this policy. First, there is a WTO rule 
that allows for non-reciprocity only in the case of the least-devel-
oped countries (LDCs). All six EPAs, however, include both devel-
oped countries and LDCs, a feature hardly compatible with this 
provision.
Second, the EU presents the EPAs as promoting intra-regional 
trade − that is, echoing EU history. This perspective both ignores 
the crucial support for intra-EU liberalisation from multilateral 
rounds and aims to inhibit any moves by ACPs towards multilateral 
concessions. The latter is very unlikely to happen, however, because 
the EPAs as currently conceived amount to a very little liberali-
sation coupled with a very big ﬁ scal problem – one could hardly 
imagine a worse package. ACPs can keep their most restrict ive 
barriers, which generate the highest welfare costs. The price is that 
they have to cut small and moderate tariffs, which will have a signif-
icant negative impact on their tariff revenues: three-quarters of the 
ACPs are expected to lose 40 per cent or more of their current tariff 
revenues based on imports from the EC at the end of the transition 
period (around 2027) (Stevens and Kennan, 2005).
Looking to EU aid to solve the ACPs’ ﬁ scal problems is not 
the best solution. Even if we put to one side the EU’s own budg-
etary problems for the next decade, not to mention the disastrous 
ex perience of EU aid to the ACPs over the last 40 years, such 
massive transfers will weaken the ACPs even more, by depriving 
them of the sovereign right of collecting taxes and pursuing their 
own policies.
In sharp contrast, a strong EU ‘trade for development’ policy 
would be based on three principles. First, it should eliminate self-
proclaimed, but rich, developing countries from its scope (one 
tenth of the ACPs have a higher GDP per capita than the poorest 
EU member states) and it should focus on the ‘poorest’ countries, 
be they ACPs or not. Second, the EU could substantially improve 
the situation of the poorest countries by adopting a ‘conditional 
reciprocity’ approach that should be deﬁ ned as the commitment 
by the poorest countries to decrease and bind their most-favoured-
nation (MFN) tariffs on a basis as non-discriminatory and as 
uniform as possible. Such an approach would allow the poorest 
countries to keep the lion’s share of their tariff revenues, while at 
the same time reducing a major source of tax evasion and corrup-
tion in their economies – hence allowing them to use these funds 
for implementing their own development policies. Last, but not 
least, the EU could go one step farther by launching, in the WTO, 
a joint initiative by all the industrial (and emerging) economies 
in order to provide to all the poorest (ACP and non-ACP) coun-
tries a worldwide regime based on the principle of conditional 
reciprocity. The outcome achieved at the 2005 Hong Kong WTO 
Ministerial is a far cry from this objective. Not only does it open 
rich countries’ markets to the extent of only 97 per cent (3 per cent 
of all tariff lines could be set aside, more than enough for blocking 
exports from the poorest countries) but it leaves unsolved crucial 
problems, such as an objective deﬁ nition of the ‘poorest’ countries 
(which should encompass two or three dozen non-ACP coun-
tries), appropriate rules of origin and strong disciplines on the use 
of safeguard measures by the rich countries, to mention only the 
most blatant ones.
e u r o p e  a f t e r  t h e  ‘ n o’  v o t e s
60 61
e u r o p e  a f t e r  t h e  ‘ n o’  v o t e s :  m a p p i n g  a  n e w  e c o n o m i c  pa t h
Concluding remarks
The economic agenda set out in this paper – increased market 
openness and a vibrant ‘culture of evaluation’ – might attract two 
major criticisms.
The ﬁ rst one is economic in nature. The above agenda has 
entirely focused on the markets for goods, services and capital, 
and has remained silent on labour markets. Hence, it seems to 
ignore the large distortions and inefﬁ ciencies generated by most 
of the current EU labour market policies, and the massive welfare 
gains to be derived from more ﬂ exible labour markets coupled 
with time-limited international labour migrations, both intra- and 
extra-EU (Winters, 2003).
There are two reasons for this silence. It mirrors the political 
landscape shaped by the ‘No’ votes whereby the ‘social model’ 
belongs to the agenda of each individual member state, and not 
to the European agenda as such. But it also mirrors economic 
logic based on an obvious inverse relationship between the rate of 
economic growth and the pain caused by labour market reforms. 
The above agenda of deeper liberalisation of goods and services 
markets has precisely the virtue of improving European growth 
performance (even though the growth dividends from more 
ﬂ exible labour markets might arguably be even greater). Recent 
studies have shown the very substantial beneﬁ ts from liberalising 
markets in goods and services (with a strong focus on services 
(Vogt, 2005)) without improving the functioning of the labour 
markets. Reforms reducing competition-restraining regulations, 
cutting tariff barriers and easing restrictions on foreign direct 
investment to ‘best practice’ levels in the OECD countries could 
lead to gains in GDP per capita of 2 to 3.5 per cent in the EC15 
(over an average 40-year working life of a European, the cumu-
lated addition to earnings would be around a full year’s worth 
of earnings) – an estimate ignoring the dynamic gains (OECD, 
2005). Table 7, which recapitulates the wide differences in practice 
among the EU member states, echoes these gains. 
Moreover, increasing labour market ﬂ exibility before liberal-
ising markets in goods and services would bring lesser economic 
gains because newly mobile workers would be attracted to ﬁ rms 
that capture rents from imperfectly competitive markets. Weak 
competition and barriers to trade have been shown to undermine 
the growth effects of structural real wage changes in the euro zone 
by allowing incumbent ﬁ rms to appropriate larger rents (Estevão, 
2005). These results underline the potential costs generated by 
the recent evolution of the EU competition policy when looking 
at services of public interest or by the ﬁ rst set of amendments to 
the Services Directive. And they show how important it is that the 
above liberalisation agenda be launched as soon as possible, while 
labour market reforms might have to wait for major (presidential 
or legislative) elections: only newly elected governments will be 
likely to have the backbone required to run the political risks of 
such reforms.
The second criticism strikes a more political note. The inter-
pretation of the ‘No’ votes adopted in this paper may seem too 
rosy to many. It is true that at the present time there are many 
Messieurs Hyde prowling the streets of Europe, playing on 
people’s fears and toying with a wide range of worrying notions 
– from ‘patriotic’ behaviour to corporatism to closures of all sorts. 
So far, most Europeans have failed to be swayed by the supposed 
charms of these failed politicians, who are unable to distinguish 
between goals and instruments – a dreadful mistake in economic 
policy. This may not last for ever, however, and something has to 
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be done about it. It is largely impossible to deal with these forces 
at the EU level, meaning that it is up to each and every member 
state to confront its own demons in this regard.
This is precisely why the culture of evaluation nurtured by 
independent think tanks is so crucial. It is the only way to calmly 
and sensibly address the fears attached to reform of the so-called 
‘social model’. A recent French example makes the point well. At 
a time when housing – particularly in Paris – is a major political 
and ‘social’ issue, Fack (2005) has shown that 50 to 80 per cent 
of housing subsidies granted to the poor in France have in fact 
been captured by their landlords. Publicising this kind of result 
– no surprise for most economists, but far from obvious to non-
 economists – is a necessary step in convincing the French people 
that there are much better ways of helping the poor. Another 
Europe-wide illustration would be to show the beneﬁ ts for the 
patients (and for the social security regimes) brought by the 
Services Directive proposal which systematises the court’s juris-
prudence on the rights to be reimbursed for healthcare provided 
in another member state. A last example is the decisive impact of 
campaigns showing the negative impact of the CAP on consumers 
and farmers in key member states, such as France.8
Transposing the famous phrase ‘a battle has been lost, but 
not the war’, the EU and member states face a situation in which 
‘a war has been won, but not the battles’. Today, nobody in 
Europe seriously promotes an alternative plan to a market-based 
economy – in this sense, the war has been won. But that leaves 
an endless number of battles on very speciﬁ c topics (genetically 
modiﬁ ed organisms, geographical indications − indications of 
origin on goods such as champagne or cognac whose qualities and 
reputation are due to their place of origin − drug patents, health-
care, water, etc.) that powerful coalitions of anti-market NGOs 
and private vested interests present disingenuously as limits to 
the market model, with very limited reactions from governments 
and politicians. One by one, these battles have to be fought with 
rigorous facts and arguments, and ultimately won.
8 For updated information, see the GEM website at www.gem.sciences-po.fr.
Table 7 Summary rankings
EC15/25 PMR Assistance Votes on RIA
member indicators to farmers anti-dumping indicators
  (see Table 1) (see Table 2) (see Table 5) (see Table 6)
Britain 1 21 6 1
Denmark 2 9 3 2
Ireland 3 24 7 19
Sweden 4 20 2 5
Finland 5 22 4 6
Netherlands 6 8 5 8
Austria 7 15 9 7
Germany 8 18 1 11
Belgium 9 12 10 17
Slovakia 10 10 − 22
Portugal 11 3 15 25
Spain 12 4 12 15
France 13 16 11 24
Czech Rep. 14 13 − 18
Greece 15 2 13 20
Italy 16 6 14 12
Hungary 17 5 − 9
Poland 18 7 − 3
Malta − 1 − 16
Estonia − 11 − 13
Slovenia − 14 − 21
Latvia − 17 − 4
Lithuania − 19 − 14
Luxembourg − 23 8 10
Cyprus − − − 23
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2  COMMENTARY
Pedro Schwartz1
Introduction: back to the Treaty of Rome
Professor Messerlin brings a welcome dose of common sense to the 
debate about what to do with the European Union after the rejec-
tion of the proposed constitution in the French and Dutch refer-
enda. Instead of prolonging the debate between those who want a 
European ‘super-state’ and those who would be content with a loose 
confederation, he tries to ﬁ nd common ground in what could be 
done in the next few years which would be acceptable to both sides. 
His proposal is to examine what parts of the economic agenda of 
the Treaty of Rome (1957) have not been put into practice. The 
surprise is to discover that so much of it is still to be applied. 
As a starting point for any discussion of what is to be done, 
one must accept that reviving the proposed constitutional text will 
be singularly difﬁ cult, if not impossible. Proceeding with the rati-
ﬁ cation process until enough members have approved it and an 
opportunity opens for a rerun of the French and Dutch referenda 
is an uncertain proposition in itself and would deepen the impres-
sion of a democratic deﬁ cit in the EU. There would also be strong 
objections to de facto application of some of the arrangements of 
the rejected text, such as the active participation of the EU High 
1 Pedro Schwartz is Professor of Economics at the Universidad San Pablo CEU of 
Madrid.
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 
deliberations of the Council. A proposal to renegotiate the Consti-
tutional Treaty poses further questions as to the constituency and 
the venue.
The results of the two referenda indicate how open to contro-
versy such courses of action would be: 
• In France the ‘Nons’ obtained 54.7 per cent of the votes, and 
the ‘Ouis’ only 45.3 per cent. Despite that, a Eurobarometer 
poll taken after the vote shows that nearly nine out of ten 
French people are in favour of continued French membership 
of the EU. Even 83 per cent of those in favour of the ‘Non’ vote 
declared themselves pro-European. 
• In the Netherlands 61.6 per cent voted ‘No’ and only 38.4 per 
cent voted in favour. According to the Eurobarometer poll, 
however, 82 per cent of Dutch citizens consider that being 
a member of the EU is a good thing, although 61 per cent 
admitted to having a negative image of European institutions.
Public opinion in other European nations would also appear 
to be divided along different but similarly incongruous lines. 
If the proposed constitutional text must be put in one of those 
inaccessible crates that regularly travel from Brussels to Stras-
bourg and back, then a more modest and realistic path can be 
trod. Much progress can be made simply by asking how far the 
freedoms proclaimed in the Treaty of Rome have been achieved 
and then proceeding to make them effective. Is it true that the 
EU guarantees the free movement of persons, goods and capital 
within the internal market? Can these freedoms be extended to 
services and to business establishments?
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The single market in goods
Professor Messerlin presents convincing evidence that the single 
market in goods does not exist within the EU. 
As regards agriculture, it may appear that food circulates 
freely within the EU; indeed, one of the arguments repeated by 
the defenders of the CAP is that without this kind of public inter-
vention members would try to protect their agriculturists from 
the competition of other Europeans. But food consumers are not 
‘free’ to choose the suppliers of the goods they consume if supply 
is distorted by discriminatory subsidies. Despite the appearance 
that goods travel freely, when the combined protection level 
(tariff plus subsidies) for meat is in the hundreds of per cent, and 
the average for food is 20−25 per cent, there is no single market 
because competition is skewed. Also, the trumpeted reform of 
the CAP, by ‘decoupling’ subsidy from production, is in effect 
unfairly ﬁ nancing large farms with public funds, enabling them to 
invade agricultural sectors covered by small farmers. The reaction 
of national governments is further fragmenting the agricultural 
market. To this must be added, notes Professor Messerlin, the 
fact that environmental and safety conditions erect new non-tariff 
barriers within the single market.
The market for industrial goods is also fragmented. Norms 
and standards are variously used by the different member states, 
as can be seen in the fourth of the instructive tables presented 
in Messerlin’s lecture − a discriminatory procedure that could 
be curbed with the help of the ‘principle of country of origin’ 
(PCO). This much-invoked principle consists in freely accepting 
goods that comply with the standards of the place where they 
were produced. It can however be made less effective by raising 
the minimum common standards agreed by the different parties, 
a likely development in a Union consistently bent on harmo-
nising rules, regulations and taxes and thus reducing institutional 
competition among states and regions. 
The single market in services
The biggest challenge lies in services, a sector producing more 
than 70 per cent of Europe’s GDP, and one where the single 
market is farthest from realisation. The aborted Services Direc-
tive would have been a great step forward in the realisation of 
the economic aims of the Treaty of Rome. The backlash against 
it shows that there is strong resistance within many countries to 
free intra-European movement in services, explicitly in France 
and Germany, covertly in Italy and Austria and many other 
countries.
Such resistance varies, however, among different services. 
Most acceptable across the EU is foreign direct investment, 
widely seen as enhancing employment and serving consumers, 
which means that freedom of establishment could be more easily 
sold to national public opinion than the fate of the Directive 
indicates. The opposition to the free movement of providers 
of physical services would be reduced if it were realised that 
national labour regulations would not be affected by the opening 
up of the services market; and its compounding with the hostility 
against the free migration of labour from new members would 
soon be lessened if it were seen that economic convergence 
brought about by EU membership brings mass migration to a 
halt – as happened in the case of Italy, Spain and Portugal. Here 
is where the PCO faces most resistance, especially in the ﬁ eld of 
professional services.
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The internal expedients Messerlin proposes for freeing 
services are ingenious and may be effective. First he warns 
against easy solutions that may worsen the situation: such is the 
proposal to exclude ‘public or universal services’, such as postal, 
minimum telecom or essential energy services, from inter-state 
competition, for these services are critical to an open market. 
He goes on to suggest that only some sectors be included in the 
freeing of services, for they would serve as a blueprint for later 
moves. Third, he proposes that some countries implement the 
Services Directive unilaterally: indeed, the obsession with reci-
procity in international matters did much harm in the twentieth 
century; the expected advantages to consumers and producers 
ﬂ owing from free competition in services would serve as an 
incentive for more backward countries. This has been the experi-
ence with business-friendly tax cuts in Ireland and some of the 
new members.
Ways to overcome protectionism
Messerlin’s Wincott Lecture is at its most interesting in its sugges-
tions for facing protectionist lobbies directly. 
One way is to use WTO rules and Doha Round negotiations to 
deepen the European single market. Multilateral trade opening, 
Messerlin shows, has been a principal factor in easing competi-
tion among European nations. An example is the slashing of sugar 
prices by the EU in response to Doha requirements. Reduction in 
subsidies and especially in tariffs brought about by international 
trade rules and agreements could turn out to be the nemesis of 
barrier builders. As the phrase went in late-nineteenth-century 
America, ‘the tariff is the mother of the trust’. In agriculture 
compliance with such rules could lead the CAP towards a uniform 
level of protection; also, as Messerlin notes, uniform protection 
reduces the resistance to further tariff cuts. The same could be 
said of industry, where a reform of dumping and safeguard rules 
by the WTO would much increase competition in this sector. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) may, however, 
turn out to be a weak reed with which to try to prise open 
European service markets. 
The principal way to tame ‘sinister interests’, as Jeremy 
Bentham used to call them, is through a ‘vibrant culture of evalu-
ation’. The European continent lacks a tradition of independent 
think tanks as exists in the UK and the USA. This is especially 
cheering for us workers and dealers in ideas. Denouncing the 
hypocrisies of rent-seekers can be both enjoyable and effective. 
From personal experience I can aver how effective an argument it 
is against the CAP to point out that the greatest recipient of agri-
cultural subsidies in Spain is the Duchess of Alba. If it could be 
shown convincingly that giving up the CAP would increase world 
prices and beneﬁ t small landowners, the political argument could 
be won.
An opportunity for European freedom lovers
Those of us who believe that the setting up of the EU has not all 
been to the bad will have been cheered by the rejection of the 
proposed constitution for the opportunity it affords to bring the 
EU back to its original modest intent. As defenders of free markets 
and competition we may not relish the idea of an ever ‘deeper and 
ever closer union’ leading to the creation of a federal state, but 
we can agree with the Euro-enthusiasts on the widening and full 
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tion of persons, services, goods and capital, within the framework 
of ever wider world free trade. 3  COMMENTARY1
Leon Brittan2
Lord Brittan congratulated Professor Messserlin on a pene-
trating analysis of the EU’s economic situation. He agreed with the 
broad thrust of the lecture but found it more difﬁ cult to accept 
some of the speaker’s speciﬁ c points. 
In particular, he did not agree with Professor Messerlin’s 
interpretation of the rejection of the constitutional referendum 
– the idea that Europe was not ready to accept a social agenda 
and that therefore the EU should steer clear of this issue. On the 
contrary, Lord Brittan argued, the key objection on the part of 
the voters was to the liberalisation agenda, a widespread fear that 
the ap plication of pro-market policies would be disruptive and 
damaging to the way society was organised. 
These were objections that had to be tackled energetically by 
all those who were committed to further liberalisation, and much 
of the persuasion might have to be conducted at the national 
level. But it was quite wrong to be pessimistic about the outcome; 
Europe should not give up too easily. 
On the broader topic of economic liberalisation, Lord Brittan 
suggested that reform of labour markets, crucially important 
1 This is a transcribed version of Lord Brittan’s comments which immediately fol-
lowed Professor Messerlin’s lecture and led the discussion.
2 Lord Brittan of Spennithorne was a member of the European Commission from 
1989 to 1999. For the latter part of that period he was responsible for external 
economic affairs and trade policy.
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though this was, presented great political difﬁ culties and should 
not necessarily be regarded as the ﬁ rst priority; further progress 
on trade in goods and services should come ﬁ rst. 
Lord Brittan questioned Professor Messerlin’s suggestions on 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The speaker had been 
critical of the role played by large farmers, but any reform that 
singled out this group for attack would have unfortunate reper-
cussions in the UK; it would complicate the task of those in the UK 
who were seeking to push the EU in a more liberal direction. 
On the mechanics of CAP reform, Lord Brittan agreed that 
reducing the level of tariffs was at least as important as cuts in 
direct support and export subsidies, but he thought that Professor 
Messerlin had underestimated the consequences of the reforms 
that had already taken place; it was quite unfair to describe these 
reforms as sleight of hand. Lord Brittan was also sceptical about 
the suggestion that further reform would encourage farmers to 
diversify into new crops on a large scale; where was the evidence 
for such a prediction?
On industrial goods, Lord Brittan agreed that some of the tariff 
peaks were too high and should be reduced, and he supported 
Professor Messerlin’s view that a liberal external trade policy had 
had, and would continue to have, a beneﬁ cial impact on internal 
liberalisation. He also pointed out, however, that tariff peaks in 
the USA were much higher, especially on textiles. As for the recent 
deal on textiles with China, Lord Brittan questioned whether 
it deserved as much criticism as Professor Messerlin and others 
had directed at it; the agreement was probably the best that could 
have been negotiated in the circumstances, and did not imply a 
drift towards protectionism.
On the issue of industrial policy and Professor Messerlin’s 
reference to France’s ‘strategic casino-and-yogurt policy’, Lord 
Brittan noted the speaker’s comment that, whatever their rhetoric, 
governments would not be able to intervene in industry on any 
signiﬁ cant scale because they did not have the money to do it. 
While that view had force, Lord Brittan emphasised the import-
ance of clear and enforceable rules that would discourage govern-
ments from moving in an interventionist direction.
Lord Brittan agreed with Professor Messerlin on the import-
ance of the Services Directive and regretted the way the direct ive 
had been diluted. To get services liberalisation back on track 
would require a considerable effort of persuasion. While Lord 
Brittan sympathised with Professor Messerlin’s suggestion that 
a ‘culture of evaluation’ should be developed in Europe, and that 
independent think tanks could play an important role in this 
process, he was concerned about the timescale involved, and 
wondered whether the work of think tanks, however valuable, 
would be sufﬁ cient to combat populist pressure against liberalisa-
tion in the services sector.
Lord Brittan’s strongest disagreement with Professor 
Messerlin was on the issue of Turkey’s accession. The Turkish 
government, he said, had no interest in abolishing the customs 
union – that would be the clearest signal of moving backwards.
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4  COMMENTARY: THE DECONSTRUCTION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
John Gillingham1
Patrick Messerlin sets out an ambitious economic agenda for 
the EU, which makes good sense in a Europe that seems to have 
lost its bearings since the rejection of the proposed constitution 
by the French and Dutch at the beginning of summer 2005. His 
sound proposals have little chance of gaining public accept-
ance, however. They will rather encounter scepticism, and even 
resistance. The EU public not only lacks a sense of European 
nationhood; it mistrusts Brussels. Although Professor Messerlin 
proposes a number of ways to overcome and circumvent this 
opposition at the European level, he nonetheless also acknowl-
edges that real EU reform must begin nationally. 
The common problems of Europe – the over-costly welfare 
state, the many disincentives to wage earning, and the inﬂ ex-
ibility of labour markets – can indeed only be overcome by 
strong representative governments acting with public consent. 
Few examples of such robust regimes can be found today, in part 
because EU policy has eroded member-state sovereignty and 
undermined national authority. Governments must therefore 
be strengthened to deal with what they face. The devolution of 
1 John Gillingham is Professor of History at the University of Missouri-St Louis. He 
is the author of European Integration 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Econ-
omy?, Cambridge University Press, 2003, and Design for a New Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006.
authority and responsibility is paradoxically thus needed for the 
resumption of progress towards eventual European political and 
economic union. Without such a transfer of power from centre to 
periphery, the integration process will grind to a halt. The success 
of Europe’s ‘great experiment in supranational governance’ hinges 
on the adoption by elected national political leaders of the reform 
policies espoused by Professor Messerlin. What is needed are new 
Margaret Thatchers. 
The construction of Europe must be put on ice until the EU 
can be reformed. Enlargement, the crowning achievement of the 
integration process, should be the exception to this rule; strength-
ening and spreading democracy – even more than the creation 
of a single market – is the European Union’s raison d’être. It can 
become the source of a renewed legitimacy. The promotion of 
self-government under law is thus an end as well as a means of EU 
policy-making. 
Messerlin sets out a sound agenda for progress. He does not, 
however, discuss the European Monetary Union (EMU), which 
must be redesigned for sustained growth to resume. Additional 
reforms will also be needed to set the stage for his problem-solving 
agenda. A somewhat despairing optimist, Professor Messerlin 
views the referenda as a welcome opportunity to clarify Europe’s 
current predicament. The French public was not alone, he argues, 
in rejecting the attempt to build ‘social Europe’; it voted in line 
with public sentiment across the EU. To which one might add that 
the refusal to delegate new powers to Brussels extends to economic 
issues as well: public mistrust is general. 
Pleasantly surprised that opposition to free trade did not 
ﬁ gure in the electoral outcome, the author presents a strategy for 
transforming groups well disposed (or at least not ill disposed) 
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to reform into a constituency for it. This is a mighty large task. 
Economic liberalism is still a dirty term on the Continent. Even 
the small, professedly liberal parties, at least in western Europe, 
back away from imposing free-market agendas. Many are hard to 
distinguish from the socialists to the left and the corporatists to 
the right.
The infamous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is Messer-
lin’s ﬁ rst target. Europe, he emphasises, would be the main net 
gainer from its elimination, though most developing exporting 
countries would beneﬁ t as well. CAP’s bizarre system of subsi-
dies and price supports obviously protects inefﬁ cient at the 
expense of efﬁ cient producers; it is also strongly biased in favour 
of large as opposed to small farmers, especially in member states 
(like Britain) with relatively small CAP payments, which tend to 
have few but large farm holdings. The decoupling of payments 
from production since 2003 (‘soil banking’) merely aggravates 
inequities. Absurdly, it pays rich idle landowners to become 
even idler. 
Messerlin advocates a uniform incremental cross-sectoral 
tariff rate reduction from the 20−25 per cent prevailing in most 
of industry to 15−20 per cent, but admits that winning support for 
such a policy will not be easy. The CAP stitch-up at the December 
2005 summit and the lack of progress in the current Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations nevertheless leave open no other path 
to CAP reform than the domestic approach. In so many words, 
Messerlin calls for repatriating farm policy to the member states 
and allowing each of them to devise its own formulas for reducing 
– or presumably also abolishing – farm subsidies. Such a shift 
would entail far-reaching reorganisation of the Brussels institu-
tions. 
To secure a reform consensus, as Messerlin points out, political 
leaders must re-educate electorates, which mistakenly subscribe 
to the Arcadian myth that CAP protects the peasant cultivator 
from the pressures of the market and spares the countryside the 
ravages of modern, capital-intensive, high-technology agricul-
ture. Farmers know this is bunk. Though many of them still like 
to feed at the EU trough, others, Messerlin hopes, will recognise 
that their real interest lies in allowing the market to distinguish 
between winners and losers. He expects such dynamic cultiva-
tors to lead the charge for reform. The adoption of blue-sky laws 
in several member states will, he suggests, help; they are the best 
means available for exposing the scandalous inequity of the price 
support programme to the public. Yet nowhere has the political 
opposition in any member state yet seized upon the fairness issue. 
Fear also perpetuates the wasteful CAP programme: governments 
in power are afraid that undoing it could lead to loss of their own 
privileges and to eventual dissolution of the EU. 
Messerlin next directs his sights at the inaccurately named 
and only half-completed Single European Market (SEM), in which 
price dispersion across EU member states remains greater than 
within them, and is also larger than in big OECD nations. Regula-
tion in the SEM is, moreover, a mess. While ‘clean government’ 
member states continue to issue their own rules, norms and speci-
ﬁ cations, the less fastidious ones set, but do not publish, them. 
Transparency often being absent and opacity and translucency 
often present, the creation of a ‘culture of evaluation’, something 
by which Messerlin sets much store, is at best a long-haul project. 
Requiring years of nurturing, such standard-based decision-
making can facilitate but does not obviate the need for public 
oversight and control. 
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Several dragons, which have been reviving over the past 
decade, must also now be slain. They are, according to the 
author, strategic industrial policy (a costly luxury in a globalising 
economy) and contingent protection (a back-door method used 
with increasing frequency to favour insider interests). The latter’s 
ugly stepchildren, anti-dumping policy and strategic safeguards, 
must also be dispatched, as must its bastard progeny, the ‘volun-
tary export restraints’ (VERs). Messerlin archly notes that whereas 
in the 1980s rents yielded by VERs applied against Japan beneﬁ ted 
incumbent producers, a relatively benign outcome, those being 
invoked today against China will proﬁ t regional Communist Party 
satrapies. 
Appealing once again for action at the national level, Messerlin 
calls for public assessments of net costs and beneﬁ ts of protec-
tionist policies in the hope of convincing sceptical electorates that 
they invariably favour insiders at the expense of all others. He is, 
however, well aware that in the absence of new competition such 
a campaign requires uphill struggle and that the apparent failure 
of the Doha Round will make it even more difﬁ cult to draft and 
enforce the ground rules needed to stimulate the entrance of 
outsiders. The trade picture is darkening and sadly, for now, little 
can be done about it.
Reform of the service sector requires even tougher sledding. 
The welfare gains from a single market in services would be huge, 
much larger, Messerlin points out, than in the SEM for goods: 
the sector comprises 70 per cent of European GDP, the level of 
protection is substantially higher, and protectionist barriers 
in services (as opposed to goods) also exist at the sub-national 
level, magnifying costs. The attempt to ‘level the playing ﬁ eld’ 
by harmonising regulations, the method favoured by the current 
Austrian Council presidency, deprives developing economies of 
comparative advant age and is, according to Messerlin, unenforce-
able. He adds that the effort to minimise damage by substituting 
‘mutual recognition of standards’ in all but ‘key’ provisions is arbi-
trary, administrat ively complicated and difﬁ cult to enforce with 
increases in scale and diversity. 
Professor Messerlin deservedly praises the draft Services 
Directive (SD) – pilloried in the French referendum as the Frank-
enstein Directive – for meeting the three essential conditions for a 
single market. It has the widest possible scope − indeed, encom-
passes half the economy − and will be of particular beneﬁ t to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which beneﬁ t less than 
larger ones from outsourcing. It also rests on precedents set by the 
European Court of Justice, which proscribe practices like nation-
ality weighting, branch restrictions and vexatious qualiﬁ cation 
requirements, while allowing other, economically justiﬁ able ones, 
such as zoning regulations and certain workplace restrictions. 
Finally, he commends the SD’s country of origin principle, 
which liberalises cross-border trade and encourages regulatory 
competition. It permits Poles working in France, for instance, to 
remain subject to Polish regulations, albeit with certain excep-
tions, such as minimum wages laws, technical qualiﬁ cations and 
workplace standards. The odds are strongly against the draft SD’s 
adoption, however, not least because the Austrian presidency 
intends to dilute the features of it that Messerlin admires. Once 
again, progress will have to develop at the grass roots. 
The Services Directive, of course, became the bogeyman of 
the French ‘Non’ campaign, but it aroused similar fears elsewhere, 
Messerlin tells us, by threatening the same two special interests: 
public monopolies and privileged providers of professional and 
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legal services. The lack of support for the SD he nonetheless ﬁ nds 
somewhat hard to explain. Big ﬁ rms, he suggests, are ambiguous 
about its enforcement rules: they approve of the elimination of 
the biggest barriers to foreign establishment, but also appear to 
beneﬁ t from smaller, localised ones. Such large producers can, 
moreover, jump borders more easily than smaller ones. Small 
ﬁ rms would seem to have a greater relative interest in opening 
up borders (to lower labour costs), except to the extent that they 
already beneﬁ t from local grey markets. The biggest potential 
SD beneﬁ ciary group, consumers, was virtually silent during the 
referendum campaign in France, because of feared job loss. The 
prognosis for the SD is grim. 
Still, Messerlin makes two bold recommendations. One is a 
partial Europe-wide liberalisation, which, though less ambitious 
than the draft of the present SD, would still cover about a quarter 
of the economy, enough to have a cascading effect. Messerlin’s 
alternative would be – in a clear-cut break with ‘community 
method’ – to introduce a multi-speed process, whereby pace-
setting nations would induce followers to liberalise. He holds forth 
little hope after Doha of a top-down opening of the service sector 
and warns that any attempt to introduce liberalisation by sector 
would only reinforce the power of public monopolies.
Messerlin concludes that regulatory competition will have to 
be the solvent for reform. It does not preﬁ gure outcomes, least of 
all the dreaded race to the bottom, but also offers no guarantees, 
which, politically, makes it a ‘hard sell’, a very hard sell indeed in 
the new Europe of 25. Further enlargement will not make matters 
easier – unless a wave of reform, he adds, should sweep west 
from a free-market East. Is this Europe by a wing and a prayer? 
Messserlin is guarded. He cautions that adaptation policy will 
be required to accommodate liberalisation losers, but insists it 
should be based on ‘regulatory impact assessments’ to prevent 
over-burdening of market economies. Such evaluations presup-
pose, he admits, the creation of a US-like think-tank culture.
Patrick Messerlin is right: the spectre of a European super-
state has been banished, indeed run into the ground by Jacques 
Delors and the many men and women who have followed in his 
footsteps over the past ten years. And he is right again: the only 
workable economic prescriptions are those he prescribes. And 
also right a third time in emphasising that national revivals must 
provide the necessary substructures for a functional EU. He also 
properly insists on an obvious but often overlooked point: that 
in the absence of a European armed force only trade can drive 
EU foreign policy. While the survival of the integration process 
requires nothing less than what Messerlin recommends, there 
remains more to the story.
Growth must be restored before anything can happen. The 
European Monetary Union (EMU) is a heavy drag on it – by most 
reckonings a full percentage point. The eurozone is not an optimal 
currency area. The attempt to apply a uniform monetary and 
ﬁ scal standard is like using a single thermostat to regulate temper-
atures in Helsinki and Lisbon. The European Central Bank’s sole 
mandate is to promote stability, not encourage growth. It has an 
intrinsic deﬂ ationary bias, lacks feedback loops and is responsible 
to no person or institution. To protect its authority in the face of 
rising inﬂ ation and deteriorating ﬁ scal situations, the ECB is now 
raising interest rates and the external value of the euro just as the 
recovery process appears to be getting under way.
The euro is, on balance, not only economically harmful but 
politically useless: it was conceived as a rung on a ladder that 
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has now, as a result of the referenda, broken apart and cannot 
lead, step by step, to the higher plane of European political and 
economic union. To restore growth and save what remains of 
the European project, the euro should be transformed from a 
single to a parallel currency which, circulating together with 
restored national issues, can ﬁ nd its level in the marketplace. 
There is nothing either new or particularly difﬁ cult about this 
idea. The conversion of the euro will be much easier than its 
introduction.
But why stop with the overhaul of EMU? Messerlin’s formula 
clearly implies something more radical: scrapping CAP and 
thereby liberating nearly half the EU’s budget, not to mention 
several thousand Eurocrats. Once this reverse Robin Hood transfer 
mechanism, which beneﬁ ts chieﬂ y France, is abolished, the second 
one, regional funding, will be sucked down the drain behind it. 
The EU will then be left with only three chief responsibilities: 
competition policy, the development of the internal market, and 
trade policy – or at least what remains of it after Doha.
With the complicated deals that glue the European Union 
together becoming unstuck, the EU will need to develop a new 
sense of purpose and demonstrate cost effectiveness. Enlarge-
ment will provide economic, political and geopolitical rationales. 
Efﬁ cient operation requires drastic reduction of the European 
Commission, the transformation of the European Parliament into 
a purely advisory body, and the reconstruction of the EU on an 
opt-in, as opposed to an opt-out, basis – something that can be 
engineered by the European Council. The EU can thereby become, 
as originally intended, a treaty-based organisation. A European 
Union that yields real and tangible beneﬁ ts – peace, prosperity 
and cultural revival – will be one worth having. It will then no 
longer be necessary to manipulate and coerce the public, but only 
to trust it. 
The only European consensus existing today is grounded in 
doing nothing. The end result of this stand-pat attitude will less 
likely be gridlock than long-term decline. In a globalising world 
economy driven by Chinese modernisation and American inno-
vation, Europe will simply count for less. Although things could 
indeed be worse, decline is not an optimal outcome, and least of 
all in a world on the move.
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